The average anti-libertarian paternalist (me) would say you are correct, but our disagreement stems from the fact that I think every human brain operates on an algorithm that has some obvious inefficiencies. For example, I think the modal person optimizes short term enjoyment over long term benefits, even when doing so is plainly irrational. This is why people smoke. The only relevant question is whether most people are like this. If you think they are (which I do) then some level of paternalism for everyone is justified.
Our second disagreement is moral. As you note, intelligence is variable, as are traits like self-control and impulsivity. If I am a high intelligence person with great self control, I can sell a lot of heroin to low intelligence impulsive people, and make a lot of money by killing them. Should I be allowed to do this? Well, if you think every human being is made in the image of God, it’s plainly wrong.
Our third disagreement stems from the fact that utility is not objective. For example, does psychological enjoyment count as utility? Let’s say it does, and I’m a sadistic serial killer who derives psychic enjoyment from murder. But I’m also a utility maximizer, so I only murder elderly women who are fighting cancer and have a very low quality of life. From a strictly utilitarian perspective, if we are counting psychic enjoyment as utility, this is totally acceptable.
Do you think paternalism is more justified (as suggested by the word itself) when it comes to the interactions between parents and children? Its tough to fit children into a rational agent framework; its not like a 6 month old can strike a Coasian bargain with their parents to stop smoking around them now in return for some portion of their future earnings.
You could posit that in some cases, the principal-agent problems between the state/society and a child are lesser than those same problems between parent(s) and their child. I think that the vast majority of the time, you would trust the parents to be better guarantors of a child(s) well-being than the state, but in extreme cases, there is a definite argument.
And unlike arguments about intelligence, addiction, or old age, it is highly likely that a young child will be a capable agent in the future, and it intuitively feels to me like that future capable agent's wishes about how it would like to be treated now are best approximated by a default to parental preference, but with some societal backstop to guard against parental malice.
Nick, see this related paper I'm working on: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4715593.
The average anti-libertarian paternalist (me) would say you are correct, but our disagreement stems from the fact that I think every human brain operates on an algorithm that has some obvious inefficiencies. For example, I think the modal person optimizes short term enjoyment over long term benefits, even when doing so is plainly irrational. This is why people smoke. The only relevant question is whether most people are like this. If you think they are (which I do) then some level of paternalism for everyone is justified.
Our second disagreement is moral. As you note, intelligence is variable, as are traits like self-control and impulsivity. If I am a high intelligence person with great self control, I can sell a lot of heroin to low intelligence impulsive people, and make a lot of money by killing them. Should I be allowed to do this? Well, if you think every human being is made in the image of God, it’s plainly wrong.
Our third disagreement stems from the fact that utility is not objective. For example, does psychological enjoyment count as utility? Let’s say it does, and I’m a sadistic serial killer who derives psychic enjoyment from murder. But I’m also a utility maximizer, so I only murder elderly women who are fighting cancer and have a very low quality of life. From a strictly utilitarian perspective, if we are counting psychic enjoyment as utility, this is totally acceptable.
Do you think paternalism is more justified (as suggested by the word itself) when it comes to the interactions between parents and children? Its tough to fit children into a rational agent framework; its not like a 6 month old can strike a Coasian bargain with their parents to stop smoking around them now in return for some portion of their future earnings.
You could posit that in some cases, the principal-agent problems between the state/society and a child are lesser than those same problems between parent(s) and their child. I think that the vast majority of the time, you would trust the parents to be better guarantors of a child(s) well-being than the state, but in extreme cases, there is a definite argument.
And unlike arguments about intelligence, addiction, or old age, it is highly likely that a young child will be a capable agent in the future, and it intuitively feels to me like that future capable agent's wishes about how it would like to be treated now are best approximated by a default to parental preference, but with some societal backstop to guard against parental malice.
No, this is not outside the framework given. Children are less intelligent. Remember that IQ is by construction age adjusted.